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Deconstructing the Mythology of Free Trade:
Critical Reflections on Comparative
Advantage
Carmen G. Gonzalez*
INTRODUCTION
In September 2003, the Fifth Ministerial meeting of the World Trade
Organization (WTO) in Cancun, Mexico, collapsed abruptly as a consequence of
bitter disputes between the wealthy, industrialized countries of the North and the less
affluent countries of the South over agricultural subsidies. 1 Claiming that the $300
billion annual subsidies paid by the North to the world's wealthiest farmers
undermine the livelihoods of millions of poor farmers in the South, delegates from

*Associate Professor, Seattle University School of Law. The author would like to thank Amy
Sinden, Jack Kirkwood, and Mark Chinen for helpful comments on earlier drafts of this article.
1. See e.g., Elizabeth Becker, Poorer Countries Pull Out of Talks Over World Trade, NY
TIMES, Sept. 15, 2003, at Al. The terms North and South are used in this article to refer to wealthy,
industrialized countries and poor, developing countries, respectively. The article deliberately adopts the
South-North distinction in lieu of the more conventional division of the world between developing
countries and developed countries in order to avoid the negative connotations of the discourse of
"development." Since its emergence in the aftermath of World War II, "development" discourse and
"development" projects and institutions have been used to justify and to perpetuate the economic and
political dominance of the North over the South. Indeed, the very notion of the South as less "developed"
and in need of Northern "development assistance" implies inferiority and inadequacy without a reference
to the histories of Northern colonization and exploitation that have produced poverty, social dislocation,
See, e.g., ARTURO ESCOBAR,
and natural resource degradation in many Southern countries.
ENCOUNTERING DEVELOPMENT: THE MAKING AND UNMAKING OF THE THIRD WORLD 22-24 (1995); Ruth
E. Gordon & Jon H. Sylvester, Deconstructing Development, 22 WIS. INT'L L.J. 1 (2004); Tayyab
Mahmud, Postcolonial Imaginaries: Alternative Development or Alternatives to Development?, 9
TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 25 (1999). However, like all binaries, the South/North distinction is
imprecise and obscures the enormous heterogeneity of the countries that constitute the global South.
Nevertheless, the South/North distinction is analytically useful due to certain important historic and
contemporary commonalities among the countries of the global South. First, nearly all Southern nations
experienced the ravages of colonialism. Second, nearly all Southern countries are burdened by debt
service to the North and have adopted export-oriented economic policies that rely on agricultural
production to generate foreign exchange earnings. See, e.g., PETER & SUSAN CALVERT, THE SOUTH, THE
NORTH AND THE ENVIRONMENT 5-15 (1999). Third, Southern countries are disproportionately affected by
natural resource degradation, which threatens to impede efforts to combat poverty, disease, and hunger.
UNITED NATIONS MILLENNIUM ECOSYSTEM ASSESSMENT 16-17, 90-99 (2005), available at
Finally, multilateral trade and environmental agreements
http://www.millenniumassessment.org.
frequently prescribe different obligations depending on whether a country is classified as "developed" or
"developing." This distinction is therefore necessary in order to describe and analyze the negotiation and
implementation of these agreements. See, e.g., Christopher D. Stone, Common But Differentiated
Responsibilities in International Law, 98 AM. J. INT'L L. 276, 279-80 (2004); Peter Lichtenbaum,
"Special Treatment" vs. "Equal Participation": Striking a Balance in the Doha Negotiations, 17 AM. U.
INT'L L. REV. 1003, 1007-09 (2002).
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Asia, Africa, Latin America and the Caribbean walked out of the negotiations to
protest the unwillingness of the United States and the European Union to curtail their
massive agricultural subsidies.2 The negotiations 3did not resume until the U.S. and
the E.U. agreed to curb agricultural protectionism.
Two years later, in November 2005, over 30,000 demonstrators faced chain
link fences, police and tear gas at the Summit of the Americas in Mar del Plata,
Argentina, to oppose the hemisphere-wide free trade agreement known as the Free
Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA). 4 The summit ended without clear agreement
among the 34 leaders of Western Hemisphere nations on when and how to resume
the stalled FTAA negotiations.5
These events highlight the growing dissatisfaction in the global South with
the rules governing international trade and, more broadly, with the neoliberal
economic model promoted through U.S. foreign policy and through multilateral
institutions such as the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the
WTO. 6 Popularly known as the "Washington Consensus," this economic model

2. See Becker, supra note 1, at Al; Gretchen Peters, In Cancun, a Blow to World Trade,
CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, Sept. 16, 2003, at 6; Teo Ballve, Globalizing Resistance in Cancun. 37
NACLA REPORT ON THE AMERICAS 16-19 (Nov/Dec. 2003). Opposition to the WTO negotiations had been
building in the South since the 2001 WTO Ministerial meeting in Doha, Qatar, where developing
countries were pressured into adopting a Ministerial Declaration that they had no role in drafting. Only
two weeks before the Ministerial meeting in Cancun, the North hastily sidestepped one of the most
contentious WTO issues by agreeing to ease access to cheap generic drugs to poor nations in order to
address public health emergencies. With the drug issue off the table, the conflict over agricultural
subsidies took center stage. Tensions escalated when the United States and the European Union made
reductions in agricultural subsidies contingent on Southern concessions in the areas of investment,
government procurement, competition policy, and trade facilitation. The Ministerial meeting collapsed as
outraged trade delegates from the global South refused to negotiate these new issues without first
resolving the impasse over agricultural subsidies. See Ballve, supra, at 16-19.
3. See Elizabeth Becker, Trade Group to Cut Farm Subsidiesfor Rich Nations, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 1, 2004, at 8; Elizabeth Becker, U.S. Will Cut Farm Subsidies in Trade Deal, N.Y. Times, July 31,
2004, at Bl. Notwithstanding the July 2004 agreement by the U.S. and the EU to cut farm subsidies, the
December 2005 WTO Ministerial in Hong Kong proved disappointing to many developing countries.
While the U.S. and the EU agreed to eliminate agricultural export subsidies by 2013, there was no
agreement on the reduction of domestic subsidies or the lowering of agricultural tariffs. These omissions
are significant because export subsidies constitute only a minor cause of the distortions in world
agricultural trade attributable to Northern protectionism. Domestic farm subsidies and agricultural tariffs
are far more market-distorting. See Keith Bradsher, Trade Officials Agree to End Subsidies for
AgriculturalExports, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 19, 2005; Don Lee, Delegates Eke Out a Trade Deal, L.A. TIMES,
Dec. 19, 2005.
4. See Larry Rohter & Elisabeth Bumiller, Hemisphere Summit Marred by Violent Anti-Bush
Protests, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 5, 2005; Bush 's Argentine Visit Ignites Violent Protests, SEATTLE TIMES, Nov.
5, 2005, at Al.
5. See Larry Rohter & Elisabeth Bumiller, Hemisphere Meeting Ends Without Trade
Consensus, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 6, 2005; Jonathan Wheatley, Bush Searchesfor Positives in Brazil After
Summit of Americas Disarray, FINANCIAL TIMES (London), Nov. 7, 2005, at 6. Several Latin American
nations, including Argentina and Brazil, expressed concern over the U.S. practice of subsidizing its
farmers while demanding that other countries open up their markets to foreign competition. See SEATTLE
TIMES, supra note 4, at Al.
6. The adoption of the neoliberal economic model in much of the global South has resulted in
a significant slowdown in economic growth, greater poverty and inequality, and growing social and
political unrest. See William Finnegan, The Economics of Empire: Notes on the Washington Consensus,
HARPER'S, May 1, 2003, at 42, 45-50 (describing the elements of the neoliberal model, discussing its
consequences and explaining the popular backlash in Latin America and elsewhere to the U.S. free trade
agenda); Cecilia Lopez Montano, People First: Standing Up to the Washington Consensus, 37 NACLA
REPORT ON THE AMERICAS (Nov/Dec 2003) (enumerating the elements of the neoliberal economic model,

HeinOnline -- 17 Berkeley La Raza L.J. 66 2006

20061

DECONSTRUCTING THE MYTHOLOGY OF FREE TRADE

seeks to open the markets of the global South to foreign competition by imposing a
standard package of economic reforms, including, inter alia, trade liberalization,
privatization of industry and public services, deregulation, curtailment of
government expenditures, elimination of barriers to direct foreign investment,
financial liberalization, and enforcement of private property rights.7
One of the chief criticisms of the neoliberal economic reforms imposed by
multilateral trade and financial institutions is that these reforms systematically
disadvantage the South by allowing the North to protect its industries while requiring
market openness in the nations of the South.8 Nowhere is this more apparent than in
the agricultural sector. While the United States and the European Union lavishly
subsidize their farmers and utilize tariffs to protect domestic producers from
Southern competitors, the trade rules in the WTO Agreement on Agriculture and the
structural adjustment programs mandated by the World Bank and the IMF require
Southern nations to open their markets to ruinous competition from highly
subsidized U.S. and E.U. producers. 9 The health and safety standards that exclude
the agricultural products of the South from Northern markets exacerbate these
inequities.1 0 In other words, "free trade" is a misnomer. The legal regime governing

explaining its social consequences and discussing the efforts of elected political leaders to introduce
flexibility into IMF and World Bank policy prescriptions in order to achieve other social goals); see
Ballve, supra note 2, at 16 (describing the growing opposition in the global South to the current WTO
rules); Fred Rosen, Changing the Terms of the Debate: A Reportfrom Antigua, 37 NACLA REPORT ON THE

AMERICAS 24-28 (Nov/Dec 2003) (describing efforts among development economists, development
practitioners and political activists to devise an alternative to the neoliberal model). See also JOSEPH E.
STIGLITZ, GLOBALIZATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS 18-20 (2002) (concluding that IMF policy prescriptions
increased poverty in the developing world and fueled social and political unrest).
7. See LATIN AMERICAN ADJUSTMENT: How MUCH HAS HAPPENED?, at 18 (John Williams,
ed. 1990) (outlining the elements of the neoliberal economic model).
8. See Finnegan, supra note 6, at 49-51; OXFAM, RIGGED RULES AND DOUBLE STANDARDS:
TRADE, GLOBALISATION AND THE FIGHT AGAINST POVERTY 5-6, 25-27 (2002).
9. See Carmen G. Gonzalez, Trade Liberalization, Food Security and the Environment: The
Neoliberal Threat to SustainableRural Development, 14 TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 419, 45760, 463-64; OXFAM, supra note 8, at 95-121; Carmen G. Gonzalez, Institutionalizing Inequality: The
WTO Agreement on Agriculture, Food Security, and Developing Countries, 27 COLUMBIA J. ENVTL. L.
433, 446-49, 459-68 (2002). Agricultural policy in the North has long been characterized by high levels of
protectionism while Southern countries historically taxed agriculture in order to finance industrialization.
See THE GATT URUGUAY ROUND: A NEGOTIATING HISTORY (1986-1992) 125, 141, 154-157 (Terence P.
Stewart, ed. 1993). However, it is the combination of structural adjustment in response to the debt crisis of
the 1980s and trade liberalization under the WTO Agreement on Agriculture beginning in the mid-I 990s
that institutionalized the double standard that plagues the agricultural sector to this day. First, agricultural
policy came to be characterized by market openness in the South and high levels of protectionism in the
North, because structural adjustment was imposed only on the South. See Gonzalez, Trade Liberalization,
Food Security and the Environment, supra, at 457-458. Second, the WTO Agreement on Agriculture
reinforced this double standard by permitting the North to continue to use certain trade-distorting
agricultural subsidies (subject to reduction over time) while prohibiting Southern countries that did not
employ these subsidies from doing so in the future. See Gonzalez, InstitutionalizingInequality, supra, at
463-468. Finally, the Agreement was riddled with ambiguities that enable the North to evade its
commitments to reduce both subsidies and tariffs. See id., at 459-468. Total subsidies in the North actually
increased after the WTO Agreement on Agriculture went into effect, and tariff levels remain high. See id.
By contrast, much of the South had already adopted free market reforms pursuant to structural adjustment
programs. See id. at 460-463; Experience with the Implementation of the Uruguay Round Agreement on
Agriculture: Developing Country Experiences para. 5 (U.N. FOOD & AGRIC. ORG. (FAO), FAO
SYMPOSIUM ON AGRICULTURE,

TRADE AND FOOD SECURITY,

Paper No. 3,

1999), available at

http://www.fao.org/DOCREP/meeting/x3065E.htm.
10. See Anita Regmi et al., Emerging Trade Issues for Developing Countries, AGRIC.
OUTLOOK, April 2000, at 23 (Economic Research Service/USDA).

HeinOnline -- 17 Berkeley La Raza L.J. 67 2006

BERKELEY LA RAZA LAWJOURNAL

[Vol. 17:65

international agricultural trade institutionalizes a highly uneven playing field by
permitting protectionism in the North while requiring Southern nations to open their
markets to highly subsidized foreign competition. "
As a consequence of this double standard, the United States and the
European Union are currently rendering small farmers destitute in Asia, Africa, and
Latin America by dumping agricultural products on world markets at below the price
of production. 12 For example, the U.S. exports cotton at prices 47 percent below the
cost of production; wheat at prices 28 percent below the cost of production; rice at
prices 26 percent below the cost of production; and corn and soybeans at prices 10
percent below the cost of production. 13 According to a report by the International
Food Policy Research Institute, Northern subsidies and import barriers cost Southern
countries $24 billion per year in foregone agricultural and agro-industrial income. 14
It is hardly surprising that agriculture continues to be one of the most explosive
issues in the WTO negotiations.
Many proponents of the neoliberal economic model would accept the above
analysis, but would argue that the solution is to "level the playing field" by requiring
the North to eliminate agricultural subsidies so as to enable Southern countries to
reap the benefits of their "comparative advantage" in agricultural production. 15 In
other words, the claim is that agricultural trade liberalization, if implemented in an
even-handed manner in both the North and the South, would raise living standards
and alleviate poverty in the countries of the global South. 16 Furthermore, these free

11. See Gonzalez, InstitutionalizingInequality, supranote 9, at 459-68.
12. See OXFAM, RIGGED RULES AND DOUBLE STANDARDS, supra note 8, at 114-17; SOPHIA
MURPHY ET AL., INST. FOR AGRIC. AND TRADE POLICY, WTO AGREEMENT ON AGRICULTURE: A

DECADE OF DUMPING 1 (2005), available at http://www.tradeobservatory.org/library.cfm?ReflD=48532.
13. See MURPHY ET AL., supra note 12, at 2. Indeed, Brazil recently mounted as successful
WTO challenge to the United States' cotton subsidies. See Appellate Body Report, United States Subsidies on Upland Cotton, WT/DS267/20 (Mar. 24, 2004). However, as a practical matter, few
Southern countries have the resources to engage in such challenges, and few can afford to risk important
trade and diplomatic relationships with the U.S. See MURPHY ET AL., supra, at 7.
14. See INT'L FOOD POLICY RESEARCH INST., How MUCH DOES IT HURT? THE IMPACT OF
AGRICULTURAL TRADE POLICIES ON DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 2 (2003), available at
http://www.agtradepolicy.org/output/resource/IFPRI.pdf.
15. For example, in a series of editorial published in 2003 and 2004, the New York Times
denounced the devastating impact of industrialized country protectionism on farmers in the developing
world. However, the editorials advocated free market reforms in the United States and other developed
nations as the solution in order to promote "a fairer playing field." The editorials are available at
http://www.nytimes.com/harvestingpoverty.
16. See Dominique van der Mensbrugghe & John C. Begin, Global Agricultural Reform:
What is at Stake?, in GLOBAL AGRICULTURAL TRADE AND DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 116 (M. Ataman

Aksoy & John C. Beghin, eds. 2004) (estimating the global gains from trade liberalization in both
developed and developing countries at $385 billion, of which $265 billion corresponds to the reform of
agricultural and food trade policy). Curiously, the models used to forecast the benefits of trade
liberalization currently yield more modest estimates than they did just a few years ago. Indeed, the
estimated benefits of trade liberalization derived from the leading trade models are both smaller and more
skewed toward Northern countries. Many estimates of the benefits of trade liberalization yield figures no
higher than $100 billion, and many yield figures much lower. These forecasts raise serious questions about
the expected contribution of trade liberalization to economic well-being and poverty alleviation in the
global South. See Frank Ackerman, The Shrinking Gains from Trade: A Critical Assessment of Doha
Round Projections (Global Dev. & Env't Inst., Working Paper No. 05-01, 2005), available at
http://ase.tufts.edu/gdae (examining the empirical limitations of the computable general equilibrium
models of world trade and questioning the expected contribution of trade liberalization to economic
development in the South).
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market reforms would also improve environmental quality by eliminating the
subsidies that promote the over-exploitation of land and the excessive use of
fertilizers and pesticides. 17
There is no question that the South would benefit in the short term from the
elimination of Northern subsidies and import barriers. 18 The phasing-out of
protectionism in the United States and the European Union would raise the incomes
of Southern farmers, and would give Southern farmers access to lucrative Northern
markets. 19
However, it would be a mistake to regard trade liberalization in the North as
sufficient to address the inequities in the global trading system that maintain the
subordinate status of the global South. Applying the same rules to poor countries
and wealthy countries will only reinforce the economic dominance of the latter in the
absence of efforts to grapple with deeper structural inequities in the global trading
system that have their genesis in colonialism. 20 As explained in Part IV below, the
declining terms of trade for agricultural products relative to manufactured goods will
perpetuate poverty in agro-exporting Southern countries even if Northern agricultural
subsidies and import barriers are eliminated. In order to ensure that specialization
and trade genuinely benefit the South, trade liberalization in the North must be
accompanied by modifications in the rules governing international trade in order to
allow Southern governments to utilize the protectionist tools historically used by the
North to achieve economic diversification and industrialization. Rather than being
consigned to patterns of agro-export specialization imposed during the colonial
period and maintained after political independence, Southern countries must be
permitted to utilize tariffs, subsidies and other forms of state intervention in order to
promote those industries most likely to contribute to long-term national welfare. In
other words, only an asymmetrical set of rules requiring market openness in the
North and permitting protectionism in the South can begin to provide redress for the
inequities caused by colonial exploitation of the South and by Northern
protectionism. These and other recommended reforms of the legal regime governing
international trade are discussed at greater length in Part V below.
The notion that "leveling the playing field" by liberalizing trade will benefit
both the North and the South is often justified on the basis of the central tenet of
neoclassical trade theory: the theory of comparative advantage. 21 This article draws

17. See Michael R. Redclift et al., International Trade, Environment and the CAP: Complex
Relationships, in AGRICULTURE AND WORLD TRADE LIBERALISATION: SOCIO-ENVIRONMENTAL
PERSPECTIVES ON THE COMMON AGRICULTURAL POLICY 2-3 (Michael R. Redclifi et al., eds. 1999);

Frederick M. Abbott, GA TT Law on Agricultural Trade in Light of the United Nations Conference on
Environment and Development, in GATT AND TRADE LIBERALIZATION IN AGRICULTURE 101 (Masayoshi

Honma et al., eds. 1993).
18. See Gonzalez, Trade Liberalization,Food Security and the Environment, supra note 9, at
488-89.
19. See id. However, enhanced export opportunities are likely to exacerbate both poverty and
environmental degradation unless complemented by domestic policies designed to promote sustainable
farming practices and support small farmers. This is because export-oriented production tends to demand
more capital and less labor and to utilize monocultural, chemical-intensive, environmentally destructive
cultivation techniques. Id. at 469-70, 488-89.
20. See id. at 489-95 (discussing the limitations of formal equality in an unequal world).
21. See, e.g., Michael H. Davis & Dana Neacsu, Legitimacy, Globally: The Incoherence of
Free Trade Practice, Global Economics and Their Governing Principlesof PoliticalEconomy, 69 UMKC
T
L. Rev. 733, 751, 755 (2001); PAUL SAMUELSON, ECONOMICS 630 ( 1 1 ed. 1980).
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upon orthodox and heterodox economic analysis in order highlight some of the
limitations of the theory of comparative advantage as applied to the agriculture
sector and to explain why "leveling the playing field" by liberalizing agricultural
trade in both the North and the South is necessary but not sufficient to address
problems of Southern poverty and natural resource degradation. In so doing, the
article contributes to the LatCrit literature on globalization and economic injustice, 22
to the critical literature on economic development, 23 and to the broader effort to
develop a progressive law and economics literature compatible with the promotion of
social justice.
Many of the points made in this article about agricultural trade could easily
be translated to other economic sectors. However, I have chosen to focus on
agricultural trade because it is central to the economies of the poorest nations in the
global South and because it is one of the key issues that threaten to derail the Doha
Round of WTO negotiations. Many of the article's observations about the limits of
the theory of comparative advantage will be familiar to economists. My goal is not
to break new ground in economic theory, but to apply the insights of economists to
contemporary debates over agricultural trade policy in a way that is accessible to
those with little or no economic training.
The article does not purport to address all of the limitations of the theory of
comparative advantage 2 4 or to critique all of the proponents of neoclassical trade
theory. 25 Rather, the article takes aim at the myths and misconceptions about the
22. See, e.g., articles by Steve Ramirez, Ruth Gordon, and Kristin Sheeran in this volume.
Charles R. P. Pouncy, InstitutionalEconomics and Critical Race/LatCrit Theory: The Needfor a Critical
"Raced" Economics, 54 RUTGERS L. REV. 841 (2002); Claire Moore Dickerson, Northern Individualism
Meets Third Generation Human Rights, 54 RUTGERS L. REV. 865 (2002); Ibrahim J. Gassama,
Confronting Globalization: Lessons from the Banana Wars and the Seattle Protests, 81 OR. L. REV. 707
(2002); Carmen G. Gonzalez, Beyond Eco-Imperialism:An EnvironmentalJustice Critiqueof Free Trade,
78 DENVER UNIV. L. REV. 979 (2001); Elizabeth M. Iglesias, Global Markets, Racial Space, and the Role
of Critical Race Theory in the Struggle for Community Control of Investments: An Institutional Class
Analysis, 45 VILL. L. REV. 1037 (2000); Sylvia R. Lazos Vargas, Globalization or Global
Subordination?:How LatCritLinks the Local to the Global and the Global to the Local, 33 U.C. DAVIS L.
REV. 1429 (2000); Chantal Thomas, Globalization and the Reproduction of Hierarchy, 33 U.C. DAVIS L.
REV. 1451 (2000); Gil Gott, Critical Race Globalism? Global PoliticalEconomy and the Intersections of
Race, Nation and Class, 33 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1503 (2000); Timothy A. Canova, Global Finance and
the InternationalMonetary Fund's NeoliberalAgenda: The Threat to the Unemployment, Ethnic Identity,
and Cultural Pluralism of Latinalo Communities, 33 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1547 (2000); Elizabeth M.
Iglesias, Human Rights in International Economic Law, 28 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 361 (19961997); Enrique R. Carrasco, Opposition, Justice, Structuralism, and Particularity:Intersections between
LatCrit Theory and Law and Development Studies, 28 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 313 (1996-1997).
23. See, e.g., ESCOBAR, supra note 1; Gordon & Sylvester, supra note 1; Mahmud, supra note
I.
24. The theory of comparative advantage assumes immobility of land, labor and capital, full
utilization of domestic resources, and perfect competition. Economists have long recognized that the
utility of Ricardo's theory is contingent on the degree to which these assumptions conform to the reality of
the particular economy under study. JAMES M. CYPHER & JAMES L. DIETZ, THE PROCESS OF ECONOMIC
DEVELOPMENT 119 (1997). While a full discussion of these assumptions is beyond the scope of this
paper, this article will highlight several assumptions that are especially problematic in the context of
agricultural trade.
25. Neoclassical trade theory has been in great flux since the 1970s, and many "new trade
theorists" are explicitly emphasizing certain features that traditional trade theory leaves out, such as
imperfect competition, technological change, and the role of history in determining patterns of trade. See,
e.g, PAUL R. KRUGMAN, RETHINKING INTERNATIONAL TRADE (1994). Indeed, contrary to the views
espoused by the IMF and the World Bank, some of these theorists demonstrate that state intervention in
the market can be beneficial, and even reconcile such intervention with the theory of comparative
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theory of comparative advantage that underlie the neoliberal policy prescriptions of
the IMF, World Bank and the WTO (the "Bretton Woods Institutions") in the context
of agricultural trade and production.
Part I explains the pivotal role of the theory of comparative advantage in
justifying the mythology of free trade. Part II places agricultural trade policy in
context by explaining the economic, ecological, and cultural importance of the
agricultural sector in the global South. Part III describes the benefits of
specialization and trade and discusses two of the most common objections to the
trade liberalization agenda of the Bretton Woods Institutions. Part IV critiques
certain assumptions underlying the theory of comparative advantage that are
particularly relevant to agricultural trade and production. Part V draws upon the
critique in Part IV to argue that elimination of Northern protectionism is necessary
but insufficient to address the problem of Southern poverty and natural resource
degradation. Part V concludes with a discussion of alternative economic strategies
designed to enhance the welfare of the global South.
I.
COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGE: PILLAR OF FREE TRADE MYTHOLOGY
The theory of comparative advantage serves as the theoretical justification
for the neoliberal economic model advocated by the IMF and the World Bank and
promoted by the WTO.26 According to the theory of comparative advantage, each
country should produce those goods for which it is relatively best suited by virtue of
natural or historic circumstances and should trade such goods for those that the
country produces less efficiently. 7 Thus, countries with abundant natural resources
and little capital should capitalize on their "comparative advantage" in agricultural
production and should trade with other countries for manufactured goods.28
Economic specialization, export-oriented trade policy, and the elimination of tradedistorting subsidies and import barriers will promote economic efficiency and will
permit each nation to maximize both economic output and aggregate income.29

advantage. See, e.g., PAUL R. KRUGMAN, STRATEGIC TRADE POLICY AND THE NEW INTERNATIONAL
ECONOMICS (1988). Because the focus on this article is on the policies of the Bretton Woods Institutions
(the World Bank, the IMF, and the WTO), an analysis of the work of these "new trade theorists" is beyond
the scope of this endeavor.
26. See Davis & Neascu, supra note 21, at 755; SAMUELSON, supra note 21, at 630.
27. See DAVID RICARDO, ON THE PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL ECONOMY AND TAXATION 13334 ( 3rd ed. 1821), reprintedin 1 THE WORKS AND CORRESPONDENCE OF DAVID RICARDO 1, 133-34 (Piero
Sraffa, ed. 1953). Ricardo's theory of comparative advantage explains why it may be beneficial for two

countries to engage in trade even though one of the countries may be able to produce every item it
consumes more cheaply than the other country. Ricardo demonstrated that the more productive country
benefits by importing goods that it produces relatively less efficiently and exporting goods in which it
enjoys a relative advantage. In other words, what matters is not the absolute cost of production, but the
relative or comparative costs of producing different goods. For an excellent illustration of the theory of

comparative advantage, see Alan 0. Sykes, Comparative Advantage and the Normative Economics of
InternationalTrade Policy, I J. INT'L. ECON. L. 49, 50-53 (1998).
28. See Fred P. Gale, Economic Specialization Versus EcologicalDiversification: The Trade
Policy Implications of Taking the Ecosystem Approach Seriously, 34 ECOLOGICAL ECONOMICS 285, 28889 (2000).
29. See WILLIAM J. BAUMIOL & ALAN S. BLINDER, ECONOMICS: PRINCIPLES AND POLICY 801
t
( 7 h ed. 1998); J.M. Migai Akech, The African Growth and Opportunity Act: Implicationsfor Kenya's
Trade and Development, 33 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 651, 657-58 (2001); Alan S. Gutterman, Japan
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Neoclassical trade theory thus posits an even playing field, where every country, rich
or poor, can benefit from international trade as long as government intervention in
the market is either strictly prohibited or limited only to exceptional circumstances.30
The theory of comparative advantage plays a central role in legitimizing
both the ideology of free trade and the legal edifice erected under the auspices of the
WTO to implement that ideology. 31 The underlying assumption of the proponents of
trade liberalization is that government intervention in trade and production distorts
price signals, thereby leading a country to specialize in products for which it does not
have a comparative advantage.32 Thus, the two basic principles of WTO/GATT
doctrine-the "most favored nation" principle in GATT Article I and the "national

treatment" principle in GATT article II-are designed to scale back state
intervention in the market by ensuring equal treatment of traded goods regardless of
their country of origin. 33 Similarly, the GATT's reduction of tariff and non-tariff
barriers and prohibition of quotas are designed to promote efficiency by allowing

market forces to dictate the flow of goods.34
While both neoclassical and heterodox economists have examined the ways
in which market failures distort comparative advantage,

proponents of the

neoliberal economic model nevertheless embrace the theory of comparative
advantage with a quasi-religious fervor. 36 The mythology of free trade, as embodied
in neutral-sounding GATT legal principles, makes trade liberalization seem natural
and inevitable, and constrains our ability to envision different economic
arrangements designed to promote the interests of the global South. It is therefore
imperative for progressive legal scholars to question this dogma in order to promote
open debate about alternatives to the neoliberal economic order. In the context of
agricultural trade policy, deconstructing the mythology of free trade must begin with
an analysis of the economic, ecological, and cultural importance of agricultural
production in the global South.

and Korea: Contrasts and Comparisons in Regulatory Policies of Cooperative Growth Economies, 8
INT'L TAX & BUS. LAw267, 283 (1991).
30. See Davis & Neacsu, supra note 21, at 757, 763, 775-76.
31. See id. at 733-34, 743, 749-50; Avi Gesser, Canada's Environmental Choice Program:A
Model for a "Trade Friendly" Eco-Labeling Scheme, 39 HARV. INT'L L. J. 501, 518 (1998); G. Richard

Shell, Participation of Nongovernmental Parties in the World Trade Organization: The Trade
Stakeholders Model and Participationby Non-state Parties in the World Trade Organization, 17 U. PA. J.
INT'L ECON. L. 359, 367 (1996); Joel P. Trachtman, Trade in FinancialServices under GA TS, NAFTA and
the EC: Regulatory JurisdictionAnalysis, 34 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 37, 98 (1995).
32. See HA-JOON CHANG & ILENE GRABEL, RECLAIMING DEVELOPMENT 56-57 (2004).
33. See Davis & Neacsu, supra note 21, at 752-53; 762-63.
34. See id. at 753.
35. See ROBIN HAHNEL, THE ABCS OF POLITICAL ECONOMY: A MODERN APPROACH 175-190
(2002); ANDREA MANESCHI, COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGE IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE 9 (1998); BRIAN
McDONALD, THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM: THE URUGUAY ROUND AND BEYOND 17 (1998); Jeffrey
Simser, GA TS and FinancialServices: Redefining Borders, 3 BUFF. J. INT'L L. 33, 41-43 (1996).
36. See Davis & Neacsu, supra note 21, at 756.
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II.
THE ROLE OF THE AGRICULTURAL SECTOR IN THE GLOBAL SOUTH
Many countries in the global South depend on agricultural production as a
source of food, income, employment, and foreign exchange earnings.
Approximately 2.5 billion rural dwellers in the South rely on agriculture for their
livelihoods.37 Over 50 Southern nations depend on the export of three or fewer
agricultural products for a substantial portion of their foreign exchange earnings. 38
Agricultural production is economically significant even in Southern nations with
highly diversified economies. In Mexico, for example, corn production alone
utilizes 60 percent of the country's cultivated land, provides employment for
approximately 3 million farmers (8 percent of the Mexican population and 40
percent of agricultural workers), and supplies the staple food of the Mexican diet.
Agriculture also plays a vital role in the conservation of the biological
diversity necessary to safeguard the health and resilience of the world's food
supply. 40 The biodiverse cultivation systems characteristic of many small farms
throughout the global South preserve countless indigenous crop varieties, promote
natural resistance to pests and disease, conserve soil fertility, minimize dependence
on harmful agrochemicals, reduce the risk of catastrophic crop failure in the event of
a blight, and improve human nutrition by providing a rich array of plants and animals
for human consumption. 4 1 Even though thousands of crops have been cultivated
since the dawn of agriculture, the world's food supply is currently dangerously
dependent on approximately 100 species of food crops.42 Unsustainable farming
practices that erode genetic diversity can lead to irreversible biological losses that
destroy the reservoir of genetic resources necessary to recover from serious
environmental disturbances . 4

In addition to producing food, conserving biodiversity, and preserving the
long-term resilience of the world's food supply, the biodiverse traditional farming
systems of the South provide valuable ecosystem services to local communities.
These ecosystem services include water purification, flood protection, wildlife
conservation and aesthetically pleasing landscapes.44
Furthermore, agricultural production plays an important cultural and social
role in many Southern nations. 45 For example, corn has been cultivated for thousands
of years in Mesoamerica, and is widely used in traditional medicine, religious

37. See U.N. FOOD & AGRIC. ORG., THE STATE OF AGRICULTURAL COMMODITY MARKETS

2004 6 (2004) [hereinafter, FAO SOACM 2004].
38. Seeid. at6.
39. See ALEJANDRO NADAL, THE
LIBERALIZATION

ON

CORN

PRODUCTION

http://www.oxfam.org.uk/what-we
40. See LORI ANN

ENVIRONMENTAL AND SOCIAL IMPACTS OF ECONOMIC

IN

MEXICO

4,

11,

43

(2000),

available

at

do/issues/livelihoods/commexico.htm.
THRUPP,

CULTIVATING

DIVERSITY:

AGROBIODIVERSITY

AND FOOD

SECURITY 5 (1998).

41. Seeid.at5-18.
42. See id. at 1-2.
43. Seeid. at5.
44. See Jules N. Pretty, Reducing Food Poverty by IncreasingSustainability in Developing
Countries,95 AGRIC., ECOSYSTEMS & ENV'T 217, 219 (2003).

45. See ESCOBAR, supranote 1, at 167-71.
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ceremonies, and the cuisine of local and indigenous communities. 46 Indeed, cultural
diversity and biological diversity are often closely intertwined.47 All over the world,
traditional farmers innovate, experiment and adapt agricultural practices to local
conditions while preserving and passing on specialized knowledge about the
medicinal, nutritional and other qualities of the diverse plants and plant varieties
used by their communities.48
However, agricultural production also generates significant human health
and environmental hazards, particularly when it uses the chemical-intensive,
monocultural farming techniques ("industrial agriculture") prevalent in the North and
increasingly common in the South. 49 These hazards include exposure to toxic
agrochemicals, contamination of water supplies by pesticide and fertilizer runoff,
depletion of aquifers, deforestation, erosion of biological diversity, and soil
degradation. 5 °
In short, agricultural production serves important ecological, economic, and
social functions. Regrettably, neoclassical trade theory often treats agricultural
products as mere commodities and disregards the positive environmental and social
externalities of sustainable farming techniques as well as the negative environmental
and social externalities of industrial agriculture. 51 Furthermore, the proponents of
trade liberalization often fail to take into account the ways in which countries that
specialize in agro-export production are increasingly marginalized in the global
economy. 52 These issues are discussed in greater detail in Part IV below.
III.
"LEVELING THE PLAYING FIELD": A PRELIMINARY CRITIQUE
The theory of comparative advantage is theoretically sound when it argues
that there are benefits to economic specialization and trade. In general, the theory of
comparative advantage is correct that global efficiency is increased when countries
produce the goods for which they 53are relatively best suited and import goods
produced more efficiently elsewhere.
However, as a practical matter, reducing state intervention in the market in
order to promote specialization and trade in accordance with "comparative
advantage" will not necessarily maximize efficiency or improve aggregate social
welfare. As explained in Part IV below, specialization and trade can decrease global

46. See GISELE HENRIQUES & RAJ

PATEL, AMERICAS PROGRAM,

INTERHEMISPHERIC

RESOURCE CENTER, NAFTA, CORN, AND MEXICO'S AGRICULTURAL TRADE LIBERALIZATION 5

(Feb. 13,

2004), available at http://americas.irc-online.org/pdf/reports/0402nafta.pdf.
47. See THRUPP, CULTIVATING DIVERSITY, supra note 40, at 18-19.
48. Seei. at 18-19.
49. See Brian Halweil, Farmingin the Public Interest, in THE WORLDWATCH INST., STATE OF
THE WORLD 2002, 51, 53-56 (2002).
50. See id.
51. See, e.g., Alejandro Nadal & Timothy A. Wise, The Environmental Costs of Agricultural
Trade Liberalization: Mexico-U.S. Maize Trade Under NAFTA (Working Group on Development and
Environment
in
the
Americas,
Discussion
Paper.
No.
4,
2004), available
at
http://ase.tufts.edu/gdae/WorkingGroup.htm.
52. See, e.g., CYPHER & DIETZ, supranote 24, at 120-21.
53. See HAHNEL, supra note 35, at 176-81; CYPHER & DIETZ, supra note 24, at 86; Sykes,
supra note 27, at 50-53.
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efficiency when markets fail to internalize the ecological and social costs of
production, when markets are unstable or are subject to monopolistic abuse, when
the costs of adjusting to market-induced shifts in production patterns outweigh the
benefits, and when countries are obliged to specialize in traditional export products
rather than being permitted to elect economic specializations designed to capitalize
on contemporary market opportunities. Indeed, unregulated market activity will
aggravate Southern poverty and reinforce North/South inequality when world
market prices for traditional Southern exports (such as agricultural products and
textiles) decline over the long term in relation to the price of imports.
Before elaborating on these examples of market failure and explaining their
relevance to contemporary debates about agricultural trade policy, it is useful to
highlight two broad critiques of the trade liberalization agenda of the IMF, the World
Bank and the WTO. One of the critiques is theoretical. The other is empirical. Both
critiques inform the more agriculture-specific market failure discussion in Part IV,
but they are also broadly applicable to trade in goods generally.
Drawing upon the insights of critical race theory, the first critique is that
free trade orthodoxy perpetuates the subordination of the South under the guise of
formal equality. 5 4 In other words, "leveling the playing field" by promoting free
market reforms in both the North and the South is necessary but insufficient to
address the problem of Southern poverty. Formal equality among nations with vastly
unequal economic power will only reinforce the dominance of the North by failing to
address the entrenched economic imbalances rooted in centuries of Northern colonial
exploitation and decades of Northern protectionism (most notably in agriculture,
steel and textiles). 55 Indeed, some critics have referred to this neoliberal vision of
international trade as "international Lochnerism." 56 It seeks to forbid the state from
intervening in the "free market" in order to subsidize particular industries or to
provide favorable treatment to any particular trading partner - much as Lochnerism
forbade the state from interfering with "freedom of contract" in order to limit the
hours that employees could be required to work. 57 Thus, the critics contend, a
regime of formal equality imposed upon conditions of substantive inequality will
inevitably serve the interests of the dominant group at the expense of the
subordinated group 58 and will reinforce the privileged position of Northern economic
actors in international trade.5 9
This critique is consistent with the "structuralist" or "dependency" critiques
of certain early postcolonial development scholars based primarily in the global

54. See Chantal Thomas, CriticalRace Theory and PostcolonialDevelopment, 9 TRANSNAT'L
L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 1, 3-4 (1999).

55. See id. at 4-5; Gonzalez, Trade Liberalization, FoodSecurity and the Environment, supra
note 9, at 464, 489-94.
56. See Davis & Neacsu, supra note 21, at 775-76, referring to the U.S. Supreme Court
decision in Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905), which struck down legislation prescribing
maximum working hours.
57. See id. at 744-45, 763, 775-76.
58. In the colorful words of Anatole France, "the law, in its majestic equality, forbids the rich
as well as the poor from sleeping under bridges, begging in the streets, and stealing bread." Davis &
Neacsu, supranote 21, at 763 (quoting ANATOLE FRANCE, THE RED LILY (LE LYs ROUGE) 106 (Calmann
Levy 1961) (1894)).
59. See Thomas, supra note 54, at 4; Gonzalez, Trade Liberalization,Food Security and the
Environment,supra note 9, at 464, 489-94.
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South. 60 As explained in Part IV below, Northern countries industrialized their
economies through the use of subsidies, tariffs and other forms of state intervention
while most Southern countries remained locked into poverty as a consequence of the
colonial division of labor that relegated them to the production of raw materials for
the benefit of the North. 6' Postcolonial development scholars advocated state
intervention to promote economic diversification and industrialization, pointing out
the disadvantages of agro-export specialization. 62 However, once Northern countries
diversified and industrialized their economies, they became staunch opponents of
state intervention in economic activity. 63 Thus, even though the North achieved
economic prosperity through protectionist means, neoliberal mythology now posits
"free trade" as the one and only path to "development." In so doing, neoliberalism
uses formal equality ("leveling the playing field" by liberalizing trade in both the
North and the South) to perpetuate the economic advantages gained as a result of the
colonial division of labor and of the North's current and historic use of economic
protectionism. Part IV draws upon this insight in its discussion of static versus
dynamic comparative advantage.
A second critique of neoliberal orthodoxy demonstrates through empirical
evidence that trade liberalization has exacerbated global inequality by increasing the
Trade
income gap between the world's poorest and wealthiest denizens.64
liberalization has had a particularly devastating impact on small farmers in the global
South. According to studies conducted by the United Nations Food and Agriculture
Organization (FAO) and various non-governmental organizations, agricultural trade
liberalization has benefited large export-oriented agricultural enterprises at the
expense of small farmers, exacerbated rural poverty and unemployment, and
accelerated migration from rural areas. 65 In addition, the export-oriented economic

60. See
DEVELOPMENT

IN

AND
DEPENDENCY
ENZo FALETTO,
&
HENRIQUE CARDOSO
FERNANDO
AMERICA (1979); ANDRE GUNDER FRANK, THE DEVELOPMENT OF

LATIN

UNDERDEVELOPMENT (1966); RAUL PREBISCH, TOWARDS A NEW TRADE POLICY FOR DEVELOPMENT

(1964).
61. See Gonzalez, Trade Liberalization,Food Security and the Environment, supra note 9, at
433-35, 492-94.
62. See CYPHER & DIETZ, supra note 24, at 170-179.
63. HA-JOON CHANG, KICKING AWAY THE LADDER: DEVELOPMENT STRATEGY IN
HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 125-29 (2002). Neoliberalism developed in conscious opposition to the
interventionist policy prescriptions of structuralist as well as Keynesian economics. See RICHARD PEET,
THEORIES OF DEVELOPMENT 48-49 (1999).

64. See, e.g., U.N. Development Programme, Human Development Report 1999, 2-3 (Oxford
available at http://hdr.undp.org/reports/global/1999/en/pdf/hdr_1999-full.pdf
Univ. Press 1999),
(examining the impact of trade liberalization on poverty and inequality); CHANG & GRABEL, supra note
32, at 20-21; Frances Stewart, Income Distribution and Development, in UNCTAD X: HIGH LEVEL
ROUND TABLE ON TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT: DIRECTIONS FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 16-18

(United Nations: Geneva 2000), available at http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/ux-tdxrtldl.en.pdf
(acknowledging the contribution of trade liberalization and globalization in general to the growing global
income disparities); Peter Evans, Economic Governance Institutions in a Global Political Economy:
Implications for Developing Countries, in UNCTAD X: HIGH LEVEL ROUND TABLE ON TRADE AND
DEVELOPMENT:

DIRECTIONS

FOR

THE

TWENTY-FIRST

CENTURY

8,

13,

available

at

http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/uxtdxrtld5.en.pdf (United Nations: Geneva 2000) (discussing the need to
address the "growing First World/Third World disparities).
65. See Experience with the Implementation of the Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture:
Developing Country Experiences, supra note 9, at para. 18; John Madeley, Trade and Hunger: An
Overview of Case Studies on the Impact of Trade Liberalizationon Food Security, 4 GLOBALA STUDIER
15, 34-35, 72, available at
(Forum Syd, Stockholm, Sweeden), Oct. 2000, at 8,
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strategy favored by neoclassical trade theory has imposed serious environmental
costs on the South, including the erosion of agrobiodiversity, greater pesticiderelated illness, agrochemical contamination of groundwater and surface waters,
depletion of local aquifers, deforestation, and soil degradation. 66
Proponents of trade liberalization would assert, however, that its negative
effects in the agricultural sector are due to the high levels of agricultural
protectionism in the North and in certain countries of the South. 67 Indeed, a recent
report published by the World Bank candidly acknowledged that "a development
strategy based on agricultural commodity exports is likely to be impoverishing in the
current agricultural policy environment in which policymakers in many countries
have mercantilist and protectionist reflexes that, when aggregated, compromise
world trade in agricultural and food products. ' 68 The World Bank report goes on to
argue that agricultural trade liberalization in both the North and the South will enable
the South to combat poverty and to promote economic 69development by capitalizing
on its comparative advantage in agricultural production.
This position, in a nutshell, is what the remainder of this article seeks to
refute. While this article emphatically agrees that eliminating Northern protectionism
is essential to the economic well-being of the South, it argues that additional reform
of the rules governing international trade is necessary in order to address the
underlying structural inequities that perpetuate Southern poverty and promote
environmental degradation. In particular, this article argues that Southern countries
must be permitted to diversify and industrialize their economies using the same
protectionist instruments historically employed by the North to achieve economic
prosperity. Furthermore, the rules governing international trade in agricultural
products must address market distortions caused by the domination of agricultural
trade by a handful of multinational corporations. Finally, the rules governing
international trade must be harmonized with legal obligations arising under
international environmental and human rights treaties - particularly the obligation to
preserve biodiversity and the fundamental right to food.

http://www.grain.org/docs/T&Hunger.pdf. Studies on the impact of NAFTA in the Mexican agricultural
sector have reached similar conclusions. See JOHN AUDLEY ET AL., NAFTA's PROMISE AND REALITY:
LESSONS FROM MEXICO FOR THE HEMISPHERE 76-77 (2003), available at

http://www.camegieendowment.org/publications/index.cfm?fa

view&id= 1390&prog=zgp&proj=zted;

OXFAM, DUMPING WITHOUT BORDERS: How U.S. AGRICULTURAL POLICIES ARE DESTROYING THE
LIVELIHOODS OF MEXICAN CORN FARMERS 6, 17 (Oxfam Briefing Paper No. 50, 2003), available at
http://www.oxfam.org.uk/what we-do/issues/trade/bp50_com.htm; NADAL, supra note 39, at 3, 7-8.
66. See STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT PARTICIPATORY REVIEW INT'L NETWORK (SAPRIN), THE
POLICY ROOTS OF ECONOMIC CRISIS AND POVERTY: A MULTI-COUNTRY PARTICIPATORY ASSESSMENT
OF STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT 124-25 (2002), available at http://www.saprin.org/SAPRIFindings.pdf;
LORI ANN THRUPP, BITTERSWEET HARVESTS FOR GLOBAL SUPERMARKETS: CHALLENGES IN LATIN
AMERICA'S AGRICULTURAL EXPORT BOOM 17-18, 94-96, 102, 106-08, 112 (1995); MICHAEL CONROY
ET AL., A CAUTIONARY TALE: FAILED U.S. DEVELOPMENT POLICY IN CENTRAL AMERICA 13-14, 18-19,
124-25, 138-39 (1996);
STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT, THE ENVIRONMENT, AND SUSTAINABLE
DEVELOPMENT 17, 314 (David Reed, ed. 1996).
67. See M. Ataman Aksoy & John C. Beghin, Introduction and Overview, in GLOBAL
AGRICULTURAL TRADE AND DEVELOPING COUNTRIES, supra note 16, at 5 (explaining that agricultural
subsidies depress agricultural commodity prices and thereby reduce the ability of developing countries to
expand exports and boost rural incomes).

68. See id. at 3.
69. See id.
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IV.
DECONSTRUCTING NEOCLASSICAL TRADE THEORY: THE LIMITS OF
COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGE
Contrary to the assertions of the World Bank, an economic strategy based
on "comparative advantage" in agricultural production will not alleviate poverty or
bring prosperity even if Northern subsidies and import barriers are lifted. Indeed,
trade liberalization in the North is likely to accelerate the degradation of the natural
resource base necessary for agricultural production, and intensify Southern poverty
in the long run for the six reasons discussed below.
First, countries that rely on their "comparative advantage" in agro-export
production are disadvantaged in the global economy as a consequence of the
declining terms of trade for agricultural products vis-A-vis manufactured goods and
the historic volatility of agricultural commodity markets.7y Second, neoclassical
trade theory frequently relegates the nations of the global South to economic
specialization in their traditional exports - even if this specialization was imposed
rather than chosen and even if it is disadvantageous under current market
conditions. 71 By focusing on static rather than dynamic comparative advantage and
by precluding governmental intervention in the market to create new comparative
advantages, the predominant interpretation of the theory of comparative advantage
deprives the South of the state interventionist tools used by Northern nations to
diversify and industrialize their economies.72 Third, the theory of comparative
advantage assumes perfect competition 3 and thereby fails to take into account
market distortions caused by the dominant role of transnational corporations in
global agricultural trade.74 Fourth, the failure of market prices to reflect social and
environmental externalities results in a mis-identification of comparative advantage
and in an international division of labor that exacerbates poverty and environmental
degradation. 75 Fifth, neoclassical trade theory frequently underestimates the costs of
adjusting to the economic dislocations caused by shifting patterns of economic
specialization. 6 Finally, the economic specialization promoted by neoclassical trade
theory is inherently incompatible with the biological diversity necessary to promote
agroecosystem health..7
A.

Volatility and Long Term Decline in the Terms of Tradefor
Agricultural Commodities

The deterioration in the terms of trade for agricultural products in relation to
manufactured goods, described approximately 50 years ago by economists Raul

70. See HAHNEL, supra note 35, at 182-83.

71.
72.
73.
74.
HAND:

See id. at 182-84.
See id.; CHANG & GRABEL, supranote 32, at 60-62.
See CYPHER & DIETZ, supra note 24, at 119.

See

MARKETS,

SOPHIA MURPHY, INST. FOR AGRIC. AND TRADE POLICY, MANAGING THE INVISIBLE

FARMERS

AND

INTERNATIONAL

TRADE

21-29,

32

(2002),

http://www.tradeobservatory.org/library/uploadedfiles/Managing-the-Invisible-Hand-2.pdf.
75. See HAHNEL, supra note 35, at 181-82.

76. See id. at 183.
77. See Gale, supra note 28, at 288-90.
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Prebisch and Hans Singer, and confirmed by subsequent data, 78 has generated severe
economic losses and mounting debt in much of the global South. 7 9 For example, the
terms of trade between agricultural commodities and manufactured goods declined
by more than forty percent between 1980 and 1998, and agricultural prices fluctuated
significantly during this period. 80 As a result, countries that specialize in agro-export
production were deprived of the stable and steady revenue streams necessary for
productive investment and for the purchase of goods not produced domestically.8 1
Economic specialization in agro-export production is closely correlated
with poverty and undernourishment. 82 The most food insecure countries in the global
South are those that divert prime agricultural lands to export production and rely on a
small number of agricultural exports to generate the foreign exchange earnings
necessary to import the foods required for domestic consumption. 83 Approximately
43 countries in sub-Saharan Africa, Latin America and the Caribbean depend on
agricultural exports for over fifty percent of export revenues, and depend on a single
agricultural commodity to generate over twenty percent of total foreign exchange
earnings. 84 These countries are far more vulnerable to market-related and weatherinduced economic shocks than countries with highly diversified economies. Poor
harvests, adverse weather conditions, market volatility and declining agricultural
prices can interfere with the ability of these countries to purchase food and other
essential items on world markets.85 Economic diversification and industrialization
are thus necessary to promote food security and poverty alleviation.86
Notwithstanding the economic vulnerability associated with agro-export
specialization, the structural adjustment programs imposed by the World Bank and
the IMF on debtor nations have promoted comparative advantage in agricultural
production as a means of earning the revenue with which to service debt, thus

78. See FAO SOACM 2004, supra note 37, at 10, 12-13; CYPHER & DIETZ, supra note 24, at
86. See generally, Hans Singer, Terms of Trade and Economic Development, in THE NEW PALGRAVE:
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 323-328 (John Eatwell ct al., eds. 1989); Hans Singer, The Terms of Trade

Controversy, in PIONEERS IN DEVELOPMENT 275-303 (Gerald Meier & Dudley Seers, eds. 1984); RAUL
PREBISCH, THE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT OF LATIN AMERICA AND ITS PRINCIPAL PROBLEMS (1950).

79. See FAO SOACM 2004, supra note 37, at 12, 20-21.
80. See Yon Fernandez de Larrinoa Arcal & Materne Maetz, Trends in World Agriculture and
Trade, in U.N. FOOD & AGRIC. ORG. (FAO), MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS ON AGRICULTURE: A
RESOURCE
MANUAL,
Vol.
1,
12-13
(2000),
available
at
http://www.fao.org/DOCREP/003/X735 IE/X7351 E00.HTM.
81. See PETER ROBBINS, STOLEN FRUIT: THE TROPICAL COMMODITIES DISASTER 2-3; 7-15
(2003); CYPHER & DIETZ, supra note 24, at 86; U.N. FOOD & AGRIC. ORG. (FAO), THE STATE OF FOOD

INSECURITY IN THE WORLD 2004 12-13 (2004), available at http://www.fao.org [hereinafter FAO, SOFI
2004]; E.M. YOUNG, WORLD HUNGER 41-42 (1997).

82. Eric S. Reinert, Increasing Poverty in a Globalized World. Marshall Plans and
Morgenthau Plans as Mechanisms of Polarization of World Incomes, in RETHINKING DEVELOPMENT
ECONOMICS 470 (Ha-Joon Chang, ed. 2003).
83. See CHRISTOPHER STEVENS ET AL., THE WTO AGREEMENT ON AGRICULTURE AND FOOD
SECURITY 14 (2000); U.N. ECON. COMM'N ON LATIN AM. AND THE CARIBBEAN (ECLAC), SOCIAL
PANORAMA OF LATIN AMERICA 22-30 (2002-2003).
84. See U.N. FOOD & AGRIC. ORG. (FAO), THE STATE OF FOOD INSECURITY N THE WORLD

2003 17 (2003), available at http://www.fao.org [hereinafter FAO, SOFI 2003].
85. ROBBINS, supra note 81, at 2-3, 7-15.
86. Reinert, supra note 82, at 470; JEAN DREZE & AMARTYA SEN, HUNGER AND PUBLIC
ACTION, reprinted in AMARTYA SEN & JEAN DREZE, THE AMARTYA SEN AND JEAN DREZE OMNIBUS 7677, 168-70 (1999).
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impeding economic diversification and industrialization. 87 Ironically, structural
adjustment has depressed the export earnings of debtor nations by glutting world
agricultural markets and causing agricultural commodity prices to decline.88 The
emphasis by the World Bank and the IMF on agro-export specialization has been
disastrous for the global South. In sub-Saharan Africa, for example, the terms of
trade for agricultural products have been declining at an alarming rate since 1980,
resulting in deteriorating balance of payments, quadrupling of debt, declining
standards of living, and growing hunger. 89
Regrettably, the World Bank continues to endorse agro-export
specialization as a viable economic strategy, provided that both the North and the
South eliminate agricultural subsidies and import barriers. 90 In the recent World
Bank report discussed in Part III of this article, 91 the World Bank acknowledges that
most successful developing countries do not rely on agro-export production to
finance economic development, and even concedes that an agro-export-led
development strategy is likely to be impoverishing in the current protectionist
economic climate. 92 The report, however, does not address the World Bank's
historic role in promoting the very agro-export specialization that the report now
finds impoverishing; nor does the report discuss the declining terms of trade for
agricultural commodities in relation to manufactured goods. It is unclear whether the
authors of the World Bank report believe that agricultural trade liberalization will
reverse the long-term decline in the terms of trade for agricultural commodities or
whether the failure to address this issue is an analytical oversight. Since the
elimination of agricultural protectionism will not address the factors cited in the
economics literature for the long-term decline in agricultural commodity prices
relative to manufactured goods, it appears unlikely that the agro-export specialization
advocated by the World Bank will prove to be a viable economic strategy. 93 The
World Bank report is a classic example of the neoliberal orthodoxy that this article
seeks to deconstruct.

87. See Howard Stein, Rethinking African Development, in RETHINKING DEVELOPMENT
ECONOMICS, supra note 82, at 153, 156.
88. JOHN MADELEY, FOOD FOR ALL: THE NEED FOR A NEW AGRICULTURE 91-92 (2002);
BELINDA COOTE, THE TRADE TRAP 34-35 (1992); SUSAN GEORGE, A FATE WORSE THAN DEBT: THE
WORLD FINANCIAL CRISIS AND THE POOR 60-61 (1990).

89. See Stein, supra note 87, at 156-58.
90. See Aksoy & Beghin, supra note 67, at 2-3.
91. See supra notes 68-69 and accompanying text.
92. See Aksoy & Beghin, supra note 67, at 1, 3; M. Ataman Aksoy, The Evolution of
Agricultural Trade Flows, in GLOBAL AGRICULTURAL TRADE AND DEVELOPING COUNTRIES, supra note
16, at 17.
93. The principal reasons cited in the economics literature for the long-term decline in
agricultural commodity prices are three-fold. First, the demand for manufactured goods expands with
rising income, whereas the demand for agricultural products generally does not. Second, manufactured
goods produced in the North reflect technological innovation and thus have more value-added than
agricultural products. Third, labor productivity is higher in the North as a consequence of the higher
wages and prices generated by tighter labor markets and by limited competition among exporters. See,
e.g., H..J. Bruton, A Reconsiderationof Import Substitution, 36 J. ECON. LIT. 903-36 (1998).
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B. Static Versus Dynamic ComparativeAdvantage: Reinforcing the
ColonialLegacy
The patterns of trade and production that produce poverty and
94
undernourishment in the global South have their origins in colonialism.
Postcolonial development scholars have long pointed out that European economic
prosperity was predicated on the "underdevelopment" of the non-European world via
conquest, colonial domination, and exploitation of the peoples and resources of the
conquered societies. 95 The transfer of raw materials from the colonized "periphery"
(South) to the colonizing "core"(North) created economic prosperity in the North and
economic stagnation in the South. 96 The penetration of capitalism "underdeveloped"
the South by extracting indigenous resources, disrupting indigenous social, economic
and political systems, and transforming self-reliant subsistence economies into
economic satellites of the North that were dependent on exporting raw materials and
importing manufactured goods. 9 7 After political independence, this regime
continued; many countries in the global South continued to specialize in agro-export
production and to import manufactured goods. 98
From this postcolonial critical perspective, the agricultural trade
liberalization advocated by the World Bank may benefit the South in the short run,
but will ultimately perpetuate the economic dominance of the North by reinforcing
agro-export specialization rather than promoting economic diversification and
industrialization. Rather than encouraging Southern countries to employ state
intervention to create new comparative advantages in industries that promise longterm rewards under contemporary market conditions, the World Bank report appears
to endorse a static conception of comparative advantage that would replicate patterns
of production imposed during the colonial era. 99
Specifically, the World Bank's endorsement of agricultural trade
liberalization fails to take into account the concessions that the South will likely have
to make in order to persuade the Unites States and the European Union to phase out
agricultural subsidies and tariff barriers. For example, in the WTO negotiations on
non-agricultural market access, the North is pressing the South to substantially
reduce tariffs on manufactured goods.1 00 Indeed, India and Brazil recently agreed to
open their markets to Northern manufactured goods and services in exchange for

94. See YOUNG, supranote 81, at 41-42.
95. See PEET, supra note 60, at 107-08. See, e.g., ANDRE GUNDER FRANK, DEPENDENT
ACCUMULATION AND UNDERDEVELOPMENT IN LATIN AMERICA (1979); ANDRE GUNDER FRANK,
CAPITALISM AND UNDERDEVELOPMENT IN LATIN AMERICA (1969); CARDOSO & FALETTO, supra note 60;
CELSO FURTADO, THE ECONOMIC GROWTH OF BRAZIL (1963). See also WALTER RODNEY, How EUROPE
UNDERDEVELOPED AFRICA (1981).
96. See PEET, supra note 63, at 107-108; ERIC R. WOLF, EUROPE AND THE PEOPLE WITHOUT

HISTORY 140-41, 310-41 (1997) (describing the world-side specialization in the export of raw materials
and agricultural commodities).
97. See PEET, supra note 63, at 108-10.
98. See YOUNG, supra note 81, at 41.
99. See HAHNEL, supra note 35, at 183-84 (discussing static versus dynamic comparative
advantage).
100. See

Oxfam

International,

Oxfam

International Contribution Regarding NAMA

Negotiations,
April
25-29,
2005
(WTO,
Geneva),
http://www.oxfam.org.uk/what-we-do/issues/trade/downloads/sub-nama.pdf.
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additional liberalization of Northern agricultural markets.' 0' Such concessions may
deprive the South of badly needed tariff revenues, while exposing the South to deindustrialization and loss of jobs 02if goods produced by local industries are unable to
compete with Northern imports. 1
In essence, the objective of trade liberalization is to limit the ability of states
to protect or promote domestic industries on the theory that state intervention distorts
comparative advantage and produces inefficiency. 10 3 The proponents of trade
liberalization attribute the economic success of the North to liberalized trade and
financial flows, and argue that these policies will likewise benefit the South. 0 4
However, the historical record suggests otherwise.' 05 Contrary to the free market
prescriptions of the IMF, the World Bank and the WTO, nearly all Northern
countries (including the United States, Germany, France, Japan, and the United
Kingdom) successfully diversified and industrialized their economies through a
broad array of interventionist industrial, trade, and financial measures that included
tariffs, subsidies, state financing of important industries, and even state-sponsored
acquisition of intellectual property through industrial espionage. 0 6 Most recently,
the Newly Industrializing Countries of South Korea and Taiwan created new
comparative advantages in high productivity industries through the use of tariffs,
07
subsidies, technology transfer requirements, and regulation of foreign investment. 1
All over the global South, the countries that rapidly industrialized in the aftermath of
the Second World War (such as Brazil, Chile, Mexico, India, and China) did so
through selective industrial policy - the use of a combination of state intervention
and market incentives in order to promote those industries most likely to contribute
08
to long-term national economic welfare. 1
Under the guise of "leveling the playing field," the free market reforms
advocated by international trade and financial institutions threaten to exacerbate
Southern poverty by prohibiting or phasing out the protectionist instruments
historically used by the North and by certain middle-income countries in the South to
achieve economic prosperity. The justification for these free market reforms is a
static notion of comparative advantage that would consign much of the South to
traditional agro-export production even though it is highly disadvantageous for the
reasons noted in the preceding section. In order to develop policy alternatives
designed to promote the economic welfare of the global South, it is important to

101. See Graham Bowley, Group of 7 Is Still Split on Subsidies, NY TIMES, Dec. 4, 2005, at
A6.
102. See Oxfam International, supra note 100; Friends of the Earth International, What You
Need
to
Know
About
NAMA,
October
2004,
available
at
http://www.foei.org/publications/pdfs/NAMAenvironmentFINAL.pdf.
103. See CHANG & GRABEL, supra note 32, at 54-57.
104. Seeid. at 7-10.
105. See id. at 10-13.
106. See CHANG, GLOBALISATION, ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, AND THE ROLE OF THE STATE
258-59, 276-77 (2003); PAUL BAIROCH, ECONOMICS AND WORLD HISTORY: MYTHS AND PARADOXES 4455 (1993); HA-JOON CHANG, KICKING AWAY THE LADDER, supra note 63, at 19-51; 59-66; Ha-Joon
Chang, The Market, the State and Institutions in Economic Development, in RETHINKING DEVELOPMENT

ECONOMICS, supranote 82, at 43.
107. See Ha-Joon Chang,

The East Asian Development Experience, in RETHINKING

DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS, supra note 82, at 111-17.
108. See ALICE H. AMSDEN, THE RISE OF "THE REST": CHALLENGES TO THE WEST FROM
LATE INDUSTRIALIZING ECONOMIES 8-13; 125-60 (2001); CHANG & GRABEL, supra note 32, at 70-75.
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replace the static version of comparative advantage with a dynamic version that is
responsive to present day market conditions and is grounded in historical fact rather
than popular myth about how the North acquired its economic might. In short, the
South must be permitted to intervene in the economy in order to promote those
industries most likely to enhance long-term national economic welfare based on
contemporary market opportunities (as opposed to historically imposed patterns of
raw material production) and based on each country's unique endowment of natural
and human resources. 109
C. Distortionsin Market Prices Causedby Monopolistic and QuasiMonopolistic Practices
Neoclassical trade theory assumes perfect competition and may therefore
neglect to account for distortions in market prices resulting from the monopolization
of trade and production in certain industries."l 0 Agricultural trade is not conducted
by countries or farmers."' Rather, vertically integrated corporations dominate
almost every aspect of the production and distribution of agricultural products-from
the sale of inputs (seeds, fertilizers, pesticides and equipment) to the processing,
shipping and marketing of agricultural output."l 2 For example, over seventy-five
percent of the global pesticide market is controlled by five agrochemical
companies. " 3 Five grain trading corporations control over 75 percent of the world's
cereals trade."14 Similar market concentrations exist for other commodities,
including coffee, cocoa, tea, bananas, sugar, and pineapples. 115 The market power of
these corporations allows them to extract high prices for key agricultural inputs and
to dictate prices for agricultural outputs - to the detriment of small farmers who are
essentially price-takers trapped between powerful transnational enterprises.11 6 Thus,
market prices reflect the power of these transnational actors rather than the true costs
of production in the North or the South.
In its recent report on agricultural trade and developing countries, the World
Bank quantifies the benefits of agricultural trade liberalization, and analyzes the
likely distribution of these benefits between the North and the South. 117 Concluding
that virtually all of the anticipated income gains in the South from agricultural trade
liberalization will be due to the removal of Northern tariff barriers, the World Bank
report identifies Southern farmers as the likely beneficiaries of greater access to
Northern markets."i8 However, since transnational corporations and large domestic
agro-exporters control most of this export trade, it is unclear how much of the benefit
will be retained by these large trading enterprises and how much will actually trickle

109. See CHANG & GRABEL, supra note 32, at 70-80.
110. See CYPHER & DIETZ, supranote 24, at 119.
111. See MURPHY, MANAGING THE INVISIBLE HAND, supra note 74, at 8-9.

112. See
supra note 49, at 51,
113. See
114. See
115. See

id. at 28-29; JOHN MADELEY, FOOD FOR ALL, supra note 88, at 121-23; Halweil,
68 (Table 3-2).
Halweil, supra note 49, at 68 (Table 3-2).
id.
id.

116. See MURPHY, MANAGING THE INVISIBLE HAND, supra note 74, at 21-29, 30; MADELEY,
FOOD FOR ALL, supra note 88, at 121-23.

117. See van der Mensbrugghe & Begin, supranote 16, at 115-16.
118. Seeid. at 120.
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down to small farmers and to governments in the global South.ll 9 For example, in
the banana industry, the European-based banana marketing corporations earn
approximately 12 dollars for every one dollar earned by Caribbean countries on
banana exports. 120 In short, neoclassical trade theory presents a misleading picture of
the benefits of agricultural trade liberalization in the global South to the extent that it
fails to account for the domination of agricultural trade (on both the input and output
end) by a handful of transnational corporations.
In addition, the neoliberal economic reforms promoted by the World Bank,
the IMF, and the WTO deprive Southern governments of the ability to mitigate the
power of transnational agribusiness because these reforms prohibit or restrict the use
of subsidies and import barriers to nurture domestic agro-export enterprises and to
protect domestic farmers from foreign competition. 121 The agricultural trade
liberalization promoted by the proponents of neoliberalism serves to reinforce the
economic dominance of transnational agribusiness, by ignoring the market
distortions caused by the domination of agricultural trade by a handful of
transnational corporations and by depriving the South of important tools to mitigate
the power of these enterprises.
D.

Failure to IncorporateEnvironmentaland Social Externalities

Neoclassical trade theory distorts comparative advantage by failing to take
into account the environmental and social costs of production. For example, one of
the consequences of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) was a
substantial increase in the amount of cheap, subsidized U.S. corn exported to
Mexico, which produced a 70 percent decline in Mexican corn prices. 1 22 The
increase in exports was so dramatic that by the year 2000, Mexico had become the
123
second most important export market for U.S. corn after Japan.
For the United States, the increase in corn exports was accompanied by an
increase in serious environmental externalities not reflected in the price of corn,
including soil erosion, high levels of agrochemical use, water pollution due to
pesticide and fertilizer runoff, unsustainable water utilization for irrigation, loss of
biodiversity resulting from the conversion of grasslands and wetlands to agricultural
use, and risks associated with the increased cultivation of genetically modified
COr. 124

For Mexico, the most significant social externality was the increase in rural
poverty and unemployment resulting from the precipitous drop in corn prices, which,
in turn, accelerated migration from rural areas and threatened the integrity of

119. See FAO, SOFI 2004, supra note 81, at 30-31; MURPHY, MANAGING THE INVISIBLE
HAND, supra note 74, at 8-9; COOTE, supra note 88, at 61.
120. See Holman W. Jenkins, Jr., Yes, We Have No Banana Policy (Can We Borrow Yours?),
WALL ST. J., Feb. 10, 1999, at A23.
121. See Gonzalez, Trade Liberalization,Food Security and the Environment, supra note 9, at

464-66,
479-80.
122. See OXFAM, DUMPING WITHOUT BORDERS, supra note 65, at: 9-17, 20-22 (explaining
how U.S. subsidies depress the price of corn and discussing the impact on Mexican farmers of burgeoning
U.S. corn exports).

123. See Nadal & Wise, supra note 51, at 6.
124. See id. at 7-15.
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indigenous and local farming communities. 125 The most significant environmental
externality was the threat to agrobiodiversity resulting from the out-migration of the
farmers who cultivate Mexico's enormously diverse indigenous corn varieties and
the displacement of these traditional rain-fed corn varieties by other crops or by
commercially available, non-native corn varieties. 126 An additional threat to
agrobiodiversity was the possibility that genetically modified corn crops might crosspollinate with Mexico's indigenous varieties, thereby producing genetic
contamination potentially detrimental to Mexican corn or to beneficial organisms in
the ecosystem. 127 Mexico responded to this threat by declaring a moratorium on the
planting of genetically modified corn seeds in 1998.128 Nevertheless, genetically
widespread scientific
modified corn has been found in Mexican fields, sparking
29
debate and public alarm about genetic contamination. 1
The commercial price for U.S. corn underestimates the true social costs of
corn production by failing to internalize the environmental costs discussed above.
Conversely, the commercial price for Mexican corn fails to internalize the social and
environmental benefits of traditional corn cultivation, including the well-being of
Mexico's indigenous and traditional farming communities and the importance for
Mexico and for the world's food supply of conserving Mexico's diverse corn
varieties.
Economist James Boyce has referred to this phenomenon as the
"globalization of market failure."' 130 Market failures in the United States interact
with market failures in Mexico to create a price structure that misidentifies the
United States as the most efficient corn producer, thereby increasing environmental
damage in the United States, undermining the sustainable livelihoods of local and
indigenous communities in Mexico, and jeopardizing an irreplaceable public goodMexico's reservoir of genetic diversity. 13 1 Liberalized trade based on commercial

125. See id. at 20-21, 25; OXFAM, DUMPING WITHOUT BORDERS, supra note 65, at 6, 17;
NADAL, supra note 39, at 3, 7-8, 90; Hubert C. de Grammont, The Agricultural Sector and Rural
Development in Mexico: Consequences of Economic Globalization, in CONFRONTING DEVELOPMENT:
ASSESSING MEXICO'S ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL POLICY CHANGES 350, 376-79 (Kevin J. Middlebrook &
Eduardo Zepeda, eds. 2003).

126. See Nadal & Wise, supranote 51, at 20-25.
127. See Alejandro Nadal, Corn in NAFTA Eight Years After: Effects on Mexican
Biodiversity, in GREENING

NAFTA:

THE

NORTH

AMERICAN

COMMISSION

FOR

ENVIRONMENT

COOPERATION 152, 159-68 (2003); Claire Hope Cummings, Risking Corn, Risking Culture, WORLDWATCH (Nov./Dec. 2002) at 13. The consequences of genetic contamination are uncertain. Most of the

genetically modified corn produced in the U.S. is engineered to contain a natural insecticide, bacillus
thuringiensis ("Bt"). The main risk associated with the spread of Bt-containing corn is harm to non-target
insects, including those that are highly useful for pest control. An additional risk is that insects will
increasingly develop resistance to Bt, thus causing serious economic harm to farmers who rely on Bt for
organic and semi-organic agricultural production. It is also possible that some of the engineered corn
genes might turn out to be detrimental to the survival of their wild or cultivated relatives. Finally, genetic
contamination could result in the widespread dissemination of more hazardous types of genetically
modified corn - such as varieties cultivated in the U.S. to produce pharmaceuticals (for example,
contraceptives) and plastics. See Cummings, supra, at 13.
128. See id. at 159-60; AUDLEY ETAL., supra note 65, at 71.
129. See AUDLEY ET AL., supra note 65, at 71.
130. See JAMES K. BOYCE, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE ENVIRONMENT 88-99 (2002).

131. See id. at 98-99; Nadal & Wise, supra note 51, at 2-3. In theory, if Mexico and the
United States developed environmental regulations that caused agricultural producers to internalize the
environmental and social costs of corn production, this market failure could be mitigated. However, it
would also be necessary to develop a mechanism for the internalization of the social and environmental
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prices rather than on true social and environmental costs can thus promote global
inefficiency - a result that exacerbates both poverty and environmental degradation.
E. Failure to Fully Accountfor the Costs ofAdjusting to Dislocations
Caused by Trade Liberalization
Some economists advocate neoliberal economic reforms on the assumption
that countries can easily adjust to economic dislocations occasioned by trade
liberalization (such as loss of jobs, firms, and entire industries) because the overall
benefits of trade liberalization will outweigh the costs. 132 Thus, they argue, Mexican
farmers rendered destitute by falling corn prices should migrate to the cities and find
alternative employment.
As the World Bank emphasizes, liberalization of
agricultural commodity markets will inevitably produce winners and losers and will
require the losers to find alternative ways of earning a living. 133 According to the
theory developed by neoclassical economists Eli Heckscher and Bertil Ohlin,
increased trade should bring increased demand for goods that use inputs in which a
country has a comparative advantage. 134 In countries where unskilled labor is
relatively abundant, trade liberalization should produce an increase in demand for
this labor, thereby producing
greater opportunities for those displaced from
135
agricultural production.
Regrettably, these assumptions fail to take into account the consequences of
the enormous transformation that has taken place in the rural areas of the South in
recent decades.1 3' The remainder of this section explains this rural transformation
and discusses its implications for the Heckscher-Ohlin theory.
The Green Revolution 137 and the export-oriented agricultural policies
adopted by many countries in the global South to service the foreign debt have
driven billions of farmers off the land and into urban slums. 138 Both the Green
Revolution and the export-oriented policies favored by advocates of the theory of
comparative advantage tend to benefit large agro-exporting enterprises at the
expense of small farmers because they require expensive inputs such as synthetic
fertilizers, chemical pesticides, and irrigation equipment unaffordable to most small

benefits associated with traditional corn cultivation.
132. See, e.g., CHANG & GRABEL, supranote 32, at 59-60.
133. See Aksoy & Beghin, supra note 67, at 3-4.
134. See HAHNEL, supra note 35, at 188.
135. See id.
136. See id. at 189.
137. The Green Revolution was intended to reduce world hunger through the development
and dissemination by public sector institutions of new varieties of rice, wheat, and corn that were more
responsive than traditional varieties to the application of synthetic fertilizers and controlled irrigation.
These new varieties produced dramatic increases in food production in many parts of the global South.
By the 1990s, Green Revolution varieties comprised approximately 70 percent of the world's corn, almost
75 percent of the rice produced in Asia, and over half of the wheat cultivated in Asia and Latin America.
See Gonzalez, Trade Liberalization,Food Security and the Environment,supra note 9, at 440-41.
138. See HAHNEL, supra note 35, at 189; Gonzalez, Trade Liberalization, Food Security and
the Environment, supra note 9, at 441-45, 465-69 (describing the displacement of small farmers as a
consequence of the Green Revolution and of the export-oriented agricultural policies adopted by many
Southern countries pursuant to trade agreements and to IMF and World Bank-sponsored structural
adjustment programs).

HeinOnline -- 17 Berkeley La Raza L.J. 86 2006

2006]

DECONSTRUCTING THE MYTHOLOGY OF FREE TRADE

producers. 3 9 In addition, the surplus agricultural production resulting from the
Green Revolution's high-yielding varieties tended to depress agricultural commodity
prices and to deprive small farmers of the income needed to purchase agricultural
inputs, pay taxes, and
purchase goods not produced on the farm - causing many to
40
abandon the land. 1
By contrast, wealthy farmers generally benefit from policies that favor
export-oriented production because they have better access to capital and are often
provided with tax breaks, subsidized credit, and other economic incentives designed
to promote cash crop production.141 As cash crop production causes land values to
rise, landowners raise rents, evict squatters, and terminate tenancy and sharecropping
arrangements in order to expand the land under cash crop cultivation-by either
growing the crops themselves or by leasing the land to more affluent farmers who
can produce these lucrative crops. 142 The rise in land values creates incentives for
wealthy farmers to expand their landholdings by acquiring land from poor farmers
who lack the capital required for export production. 143 Finally, to the extent that
bilateral and multilateral trade agreements and IMF and World Bank loan
conditionalities require Southern countries to relax restrictions on foreign land
ownership, transnational corporations often participate in the land grab, thereby
accelerating the exodus of poor farmers from the countryside. 144
The exodus from rural areas in recent decades has been so great that
unemployment in the global South is rising rather than falling and real wages
continue to decline. 145 Even in Mexico, a middle-income Southern country, job
creation in the manufacturing sector has not kept pace with the post-NAFTA exodus
from agriculture, thereby negating the beneficial effects on of trade liberalization on
employment and wages predicted by the Heckscher-Ohlin theory. 146 As the Mexican
example illustrates, trade liberalization has failed to deliver the promised wage and
employment benefits in the global South. This failure underscores the limitations of
de-contextualized economic theories (such as the Heckscher-Ohlin theory) that
neglect to consider historical contexts and real-world economic and political
dynamics. 147
Unfortunately, the World Bank continues to prescribe agro-export
production based on comparative advantage as a way of "modernizing" agricultural

139. See Gonzalez, Trade Liberalization,Food Security and the Environment,supra note 9, at
442, 467-68.

140. Seeid. at443.
141. See SAPRIN,supra note 66, at 13, 114.
142. See CONROY ET AL., supra note 66, at 37-38; THRUPP, BITTERSWEET HARVESTS, supra
note 66, at 70; HAHNEL, supra note 35, at 189.
143. See CONROY ET AL., supra note 66, at 38; THRUPP, BITTERSWEET HARVESTS, supra
note 66, at 70; HAUNEL, supranote 35, at 189.
144. See HAHNEL, supra note 35, at 189.
145. Seeid. at 190.
146. See id. In Mexico, trade liberalization under NAFTA failed to create sufficient new
manufacturing jobs to offset demographic expansion and to absorb displaced rural dwellers. Moreover,
many of the new manufacturing jobs created after 1994 paid low wages and did not provide benefits. As a
result, poverty remains widespread in the aftermath of NAFTA, and inequality has increased. See Kevin P.
Gallagher & Lyuba Zarsky, Sustainable IndustrialDevelopment? The Performanceof Mexico's FDI-Led
Integration Strategy 44-47 (Global Development and Environment Institute Working Paper, 2004),
availableat http://www.ase.tufts.edu/gdae/Pubs/rp/MEXlCOFDIREPORT I1-03.pdf.
147. See HAHNEL, supra note 35, at 189.
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production in the South. 148 Ignoring the real-world impact of "modem," exportoriented agricultural production, the World Bank's recommendations will exacerbate
rural inequality and will perpetuate the exodus of poor farmers to the cities. 149 This,
in turn, is likely to overwhelm the capacity of Southern governments to provide jobs
and housing, accelerating migration to the North.
F.

Biodiversityand the Problem of Export Monocultures

As explained in Part II of this article, biological diversity is necessary for
the resilience of the world's food supply and for the health of local ecosystems. 150
Industrial agriculture (as opposed to both traditional and modem farming systems
that cultivate diverse crops and diverse varieties of a particular crop) increases
susceptibility to pests and disease, depletes the soil of vital nutrients, promotes
reliance on chemical pesticides and fertilizers, increases the risk of catastrophic crop
failure in the event of ecological disturbances (such as droughts and blights), and
impairs human nutrition by reducing the variety of foods consumed.' 5 1 Thus,
economic policies that directly or indirectly promote monocultural production
techniques jeopardize the biological diversity necessary for ecosystem health.
Neoclassical trade theory promotes economic specialization in goods in
which a particular country possesses a comparative advantage. For countries wellsuited to agricultural production, neoclassical trade theory would counsel
specialization in a handful of primary agricultural commodities and importation of
manufactured goods produced in other countries.1 52 By extending the principle of
specialization from the factory to the field, neoclassical trade theory runs afoul of the
biological diversity necessary to preserve the health and long-term productivity of
agroecosystems. 153 While it is understandable that David Ricardo, writing in the
early 19 th century, might not be familiar with the contemporary principles of
ecology, it is alarming that the dominant model of agricultural production in the 21's
century in the North (and increasingly in the South) is one that breeds uniform, highyielding crops utilizing
enormous amounts of agrochemicals in monocultural
54
farming systems. 1
The Northern agricultural model was extended to the South in successive
stages. Export-oriented agricultural production was introduced in Asia, Africa and
Latin America during the colonial period as a means of supplying the colonizing
powers with raw materials, and it remained in place in much of the South after
political independence. 155 In the aftermath of World War II, the Green Revolution
extended monocultural production techniques from cash crops to food crops, and

148. See Aksoy & Beghin, supra note 67, at 1.
149. See PETER EINARSSON, FORUM SYD, AGRICULTURAL TRADE POLICY As IF FOOD
SECURITY
AND
ECOLOGICAL
SUSTAINABILITY
MATTERED
23
(2000),
available at
http://www.agobservatory.org/library.cfm?reflD=29994.
150. See generally LORI ANN THRUPP, WORLD RES. INST., LINKING BIODIVERSITY AND
AGRICULTURE: CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES FOR SUSTAINABLE FOOD SECURITY 5-20 (1997).

151. See id. at 26-32; GARY FOWLER & PAT MOONEY, SHATTERING: FOOD, POLITICS AND THE
LOSS OF GENETIC DIVERSITY 82-83 (1996).
152. See Gale, supra note 28, at 288-90.
153. See id. at 289-90.
154. See THRUPP, CULTIVATING DIVERSITY, supranote 40, at 21.
155. See WOLF, supra note 96, at 140-141, 310-341.
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encouraged farmers throughout the South to abandon traditional biodiverse
cultivation techniques in favor of uniform seeds that produced high yields in
conjunction with synthetic fertilizers, chemical pesticides, and irrigation. 156 Finally,
the export-oriented agricultural trade and production strategies mandated by the IMF
and the World Bank beginning in the 1980s to boost the foreign exchange earnings
available to service the foreign debt played an important role in the rapid expansion
of industrial agriculture in the South. 57 The spread of industrial agriculture from the
North to the South has resulted in the loss of thousands of traditional crop varieties,
higher levels of pesticide-related 158illness, agrochemical contamination of water
supplies, and depletion of aquifers.
The World Bank acknowledges that agricultural trade liberalization will
result in a shift of agricultural production from the North to the South. 59 The World
Bank applauds this development and argues that the additional revenue resulting
from trade liberalization will boost rural incomes and provide developing countries
with the means to "modernize farming practices." 160 Unfortunately, the expansion
of "modem" industrial agriculture in the South is likely to be accompanied by the
negative environmental externalities described in this section and by the negative
social externalities (greater poverty and inequality) described in the preceding
section, neither of which will be reflected in commodity prices. It would therefore
be a mistake to view this shift in production as "efficient" or "welfare-enhancing." 161

V.
BEYOND TRADE LIBERALIZATION: AN AGENDA FOR THE SOUTH
The foregoing critique of the theory of comparative advantage, as applied to
the agricultural sector by the proponents of neoliberal economic orthodoxy, must not
be construed as a defense of Northern protectionism. On the contrary, my work has
consistently decried the devastating impact of Northern agricultural subsidies and
import barriers on small farmers in the global South, and has called for agricultural
trade liberalization in the North as the necessary prerequisite to poverty alleviation in
the South. 62 Agricultural trade liberalization is necessary to advance the interests of

156. See FOWLER & MOONEY, supra note 151, at 56-60.
157. See SAPRIN, supranote 66, at 124-26.
158. See Gonzalez, Trade Liberalization,Food Security and the Environment, supra note 9, at

469-70.
159. Mensbrugghe &. Beghin, supra note 16, at 130.
160. Aksoy & Beghin, supra note 67, at 1.
161. If the costs of industrial agriculture were fully internalized through stringent
environmental regulation, then market prices might favor sustainable farming techniques. Unfortunately,
even in the United States, with its considerable resources and decades of environmental experience,
environmental regulation of agricultural production is woefully inadequate. See David E. Adelman & John
H. Barton, Environmental Regulation for Agriculture: Towards a Framework to Promote Sustainable
Intensive Agriculture, 21 STAN. ENVTL. L. L.J. 3, 17-29 (2002). The United States' failure to internalize
the costs of agricultural production is by no means anomalous. An interdisciplinary assessment of the
total costs of the environmental and health externalities associated with "modem" agriculture in the
United Kingdom concluded that these costs were substantial - equivalent to 89 percent of net farm
income. See Jules N. Pretty et al., An Assessment of the Total External Costs of UK Agriculture, 65
AGRIC. SYSTEMS 113, 130 (2000).
162. See Gonzalez, Institutionalizing Inequality, supra note 9, at 484-85, 487-88; Gonzalez,
Trade Liberalization,FoodSecurity and the Environment, supra note 9, at 458-60, 488.
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the global South, but it is by no means sufficient to overcome the economic
dislocation produced by centuries of colonial exploitation and decades of Northern
protectionism. 163
The critique of comparative advantage forth in this article underscores the
importance of grounding economic theory in history rather than myth and making
certain that it responds to contemporary challenges, including extreme economic
inequality, severe environmental damage, and the enormous economic power of
transnational corporations.
The advocates of the neoliberal economic model are engaged in a relentless
battle to erase history - both the history of the South's economic subordination and
the history of the North's use of protectionist instruments to achieve economic
prosperity. It is therefore vitally important for progressive legal scholars to explain
that the South's "comparative advantage" in agricultural production was imposed
rather than chosen and that it leads inexorably to poverty rather than prosperity as a
consequence of the declining terms of trade for agricultural products. Similarly, it is
important for progressive legal scholars to shatter the myth that the North's
economic dominance is the product of free trade and free capital flows. Such
mythology is very dangerous in that it obscures the colonial and postcolonial plunder
of the South's resources and justifies depriving the South of the ability to promote
economic diversification and industrialization through the very same protectionist
instruments used by the North achieve economic prosperity.
Without historical context, the neoliberal call for "leveling the playing
field" by liberalizing agricultural trade in both the North and the South possesses the
inherent appeal of formal equality. Without historical context, the neoliberal
prescription that the South capitalize on its comparative advantage in agricultural
production likewise appears logical and pragmatic. However, the historical context
makes it evident that trade liberalization in the North, while beneficial to Southern
farmers in the short term, will ultimately reinforce Southern poverty if
unaccompanied by measures designed to mitigate the advantage conferred on the
North by the colonial enterprise and by decades of agricultural and industrial
protectionism. These measures should consist of some combination of economic
reparations (such as unconditional debt forgiveness) as well as the right of Southern
countries to utilize protectionism to promote those industries most likely to enhance
long-term national economic welfare based on contemporary market conditions.
The advocates of the neoliberal economic model are also at war with
contemporary social and ecological reality. By labeling the consequences of trade
liberalization as inconvenient "externalities," the proponents of neoliberal orthodoxy
trivialize the significant social and environmental consequences associated with the
shift of "modem" industrial agriculture from the North to the South as the
elimination of Northern subsidies makes agricultural production in the North more
expensive. These consequences include disruption of traditional and indigenous
farming communities, massive unemployment, migration to urban areas ill-equipped
to absorb displaced rural dwellers, loss of biological diversity, soil degradation,
increased human exposure to toxic agrochemicals, contamination of water supplies
by pesticides and fertilizers, and depletion of local aquifers.

163. See Gonzalez, Trade Liberalization, Food Security and the Environment, supra note 9, at
464,489.
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As explained in Part IV of this article, trade liberalization will not promote
efficiency as long as the environmental and social costs of production are not
reflected in market prices. Furthermore, the economic specialization promoted by
the theory of comparative advantage must be reconciled with the ecological
imperative of preserving biodiversity to foster long-term agricultural productivity.
Finally, the economic specialization advocated by neoclassical trade theory must be
reconciled with the social and political reality. The Green Revolution and the agroexport-oriented policies promoted by the World Bank and the IMF provoked such an
exodus from the countryside in many countries of the global South that the beneficial
effects of trade liberalization predicted by Heckscher and Ohlin have failed to
materialize.
Rather than recommending further trade liberalization in accordance with
abstract theories and one-size-fits-all economic models, it is important to tailor
policy recommendations to the concrete social and ecological challenges facing the
global South. For example, countries with a large rural population and an abundance
of unskilled labor may be better served by labor intensive ecologically sustainable
agricultural production than by "modem" capital-intensive ecologically harmful
industrial agriculture. In addition to generating rural employment and protecting the
natural resource base necessary for food production, environmentally friendly
farming techniques have demonstrably boosted food production in Asia, Africa and
Latin America. 164
Finally, by seeking to limit government intervention in the economy
without addressing the distortions in global agricultural markets caused by
transnational corporations, neoliberal orthodoxy perpetuates the domination of
agricultural trade by transnational agribusiness. Trade liberalization, even if applied
in an even-handed manner in the North and the South, limits the ability of Southern
governments to use subsidies and tariffs to protect domestic farmers and promote
domestic agro-export industries. In so doing, trade liberalization reinforces the
economic power of transnational agribusiness at the expense of governments and
small farmers in the global South. A legal strategy designed to mitigate the
economic power of the North must necessarily target the concentration of corporate
power that can lead to monopolistic abuse.
Based on the foregoing analysis, it is possible to develop three general
recommendations that will advance the interests of the global South in the ongoing
Doha Round of WTO negotiations.
First, reform of international trade policy must begin by recognizing the
multi-functionality of the agricultural sector. Agricultural production provides food,
income, employment, and foreign exchange earnings for billions of rural dwellers in
the global South. It also provides important ecosystem services (such as water
purification, flood protection and wildlife conservation), and plays an important role
in the conservation of the biological diversity essential to the integrity of the world's
food supply. Indeed, biological diversity and cultural diversity are often closely
linked due to the important role of local and indigenous farming communities in the
164. See Pretty, Reducing Food Poverty by IncreasingSustainability in Developing Countries,
supra note 44, at 217-234; Jules Pretty & Rachel Hine, The PromisingSpread of SustainableAgriculture
in Asia, 24 NATURAL RESOURCES FORUM 107-21 (2000); Jules Pretty, Can SustainableAgriculture Feed
Africa? New Evidence on Progress, Processes and Impacts, 1 ENVIRONMENT, DEVELOPMENT AND
SUSTAINABILITY 253-274 (1999).
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conservation of the world's agrobioversity.
Because agricultural production plays an important role in meeting basic
human rights (such as the right to food and the right to cultural diversity) and in
protecting biodiversity, it is important to reconcile the rules governing international
trade in agricultural products with environmental law and human rights law. For
example, the right to food is recognized as a basic human right in the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights1 65 and in the Covenant on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights. 166 The obligation of states to protect biodiversity and to protect and
preserve the traditional practices and lifestyles of indigenous and local communities
is enshrined in the Convention on Biological Diversity. 167 The right to cultural
diversity is also recognized in the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights 68 and in the International Labor Organization Convention (No. 169)
Concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries. 169 International
trade law must be harmonized with these and other legal obligations, and Southern
countries must continue to insist that food security, rural development, cultural
integrity, and biodiversity protection be central rather than peripheral considerations
in the Doha Round of WTO negotiations.
Second, food security and poverty alleviation in the South require economic
diversification and industrialization. Eliminating agricultural protectionism in the
North is an important first step in a larger reform agenda, but it will not be sufficient
to advance the interests of the global South unless restrictions on both industrial and
agricultural protectionism are lifted for the benefit of Southern countries. Rather
than impeding the ability of Southern governments to intervene in the market in
order to create their comparative advantage, the rules governing global trade must
encourage the South to utilize subsidies, tariffs and other forms of state intervention
in order to nurture infant domestic industries, promote food security, protect the
environment, preserve the livelihoods of local and indigenous rural communities,
and forge dynamic links between foreign investment and the local economy.
Third, the rules governing international trade should address distortions in
global agricultural markets caused by the concentration of market power in a handful
of transnational corporations.
By ignoring the distortions caused by market
concentration in the agricultural sector while limiting the ability of developing
countries to utilize tariffs and subsidies to protect domestic farmers or to promote
infant agro-export industries, the rules governing international agricultural trade
currently reinforce the economic dominance of transnational agribusiness at the
expense of the South, particularly the Southern poor.

165. See Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A, U.N. GAOR, section III,
art. 25 (Dec. 10, 1948).
166. See International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, art.
11,993 U.N.T.S. 3.

167. See Convention on Biological Diversity, preamble and art. 8(j), reprinted in 31 I.L.M.
818 (1992).
168. See International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, art. 27, 999
U.N.T.S. 171.
169. See International Labor Organization Convention (No. 169) Concerning Indigenous and
Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries, June 27, 1989, arts. 2, 5, 7, and 8, 28 I.L.M. 1382 (1989).
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CONCLUSION

This article has employed insights from neoclassical and heterodox
economics to critique the theory of comparative advantage as applied to the
agricultural sector by certain proponents of the neoliberal economic model. The
article has argued that progressive legal scholars need to draw upon economic theory
in order to deepen their critique of the free market fundamentalism that underlies the
policy prescriptions of the IMF, the World Bank, and the WTO, and in order to
develop altemative economic and legal strategies designed to promote social justice
and environmental protection. While the article uses agriculture as an example, its
basic approach is broadly applicable to other economic sectors.
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